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CONVERSION RIGHTS AND THE DESIGN OF
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
ALEXANDER J. TRIANTIS
GEORGE G. TRIANTIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the academic insights into the capital structure decision of a
corporation have been based on the dichotomous choice between debt and
equity. A debt investor purchases the right to receive a sequence of
payments at specified future dates. If the firm fails to meet its payment
obligation, the debtholder is entitled to force the firm to surrender assets
that may be sold to satisfy the debt. In contrast, an equity investor is
entitled to the residue after the claims of creditors are satisfied in full. The
equityholder may receive dividends, but these are paid at the discretion of
the firm's management and only to the extent allowed by law and by the
firm's contracts with its debtholders. Equityholders vote for the directors
of the company, who govern the firm through their appointees, the
managers.
The foregoing characteristics of the plain debt and equity contracts may
be varied along a number of dimensions. Thus, the attention of financial
economists seems to have shifted from the optimal mix of debt and equity
financing to the design of securities.' As contracting flexibility is
exploited, securities combining the identifying characteristics of debt and
equity emerge, blurring the distinctions between the two traditional
financing paradigms and correspondingly diluting their analytical useful-
ness. Therefore, a superior taxonomy for understanding capital structure
may be one that abandons the debt-equity dichotomy and refers directly to
* School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Madison and School of Law, University of
Virginia, respectively. We are grateful for comments from Barry Adler, Clay Gillette, Lynn LoPucki,
Robert Rasmussen, David Skeel, and participants at the Interdisciplinary Conference on Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Theory at Washington University, February 25-26, 1994. We thank Bill Allen (Virginia
Law Class of 1996) for research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Franklin Allen, The Changing Nature of Debt and Equity: A Financial Perspective,
in ARE THE DISTINCTIONs BETmEEN DEBT AND EQUITY DISAPPEARING? 12 (Richard W. Kopeke & Eric
S. Rosengren eds., 1989). Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to
Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473 (1992) (discussing governance or control attributes
of securities).
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the various financial and governance features that may be embodied in any
given financial instrument. From the latter perspective, we outline the
principal building blocks in the remainder of Part I.
A firm's capital structure allocates its cash flow among the firm's
investors and specifies the times at which each investor is paid its
allocation. An investor's claim may be (1) fixed, (2) contingent on the
value of a specified asset (such as the market price of a commodity) or a
flow variable (such as the earnings of the issuer), (3) within the discretion
of the issuer (as in the case of common stock dividends), or (4) a
combination of these features. An investor is entitled to receive from the
issuer the value of its claim in cash at specified times or on the occurrence
of specified events. For example, a bondholder is entitled to payment of
the principal at the maturity date specified in the bond instrument and, in
the case of a coupon bond, is entitled to receive cash payments of interest
at specified times prior to the principal repayment. In most cases, the
bondholder is also entitled to payment upon any event of default defined
in its contract with the issuer.
The firm's contracts with its investors also assign the levers by which
they may influence the firm's decisions. This is most obvious in the case
of the common stockholder who has the right to vote for the appointment
or displacement of directors and who can enforce the directors' fiduciary
obligations to the corporation. However, short debt maturities make firms
sensitive to the concerns of debtholders, and restrictive covenants in trust
indentures, loan agreements, or preferred stock issues constrain the firm's
decisions. These covenants may be quite broad and restrictive enough to
require the assent of the securityholder to important decisions of the firm.
An investor's claim is defined not only by its contractual rights against
the issuer, but also by the relation between the investor's claim and those
of other investors. This concept of relative standing is most clearly
reflected in the notion of priority within a hierarchical capital structure. In
general, priority determines the right of the investor to be paid in full
before claims with lower priority are paid anything. The position of a
financial claim in the hierarchical structure of the issuer is often explicit:
a bond may be contractually assigned a priority as senior, junior, or
subordinated, or the issuer may grant a mortgage or security interest over
all or a subset of the firm's assets. However, priority can effectively be
replicated by giving an investor the right to have its claim, or a part of it
(e.g., coupon interest), paid earlier rather than later. This may be
accomplished by specifying a short maturity date, making a demand loan,
[VOL. 72:1231
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or providing restrictive events of default.2
A class of investors is entitled to the residue after all others have been
paid their claims, and this residue has no upper bound. Traditionally, these
investors also hold the lowest priority in the hierarchy: the paradigmatic
common shareholder who enjoys the surplus in good times must also stand
at the end of the queue in dissolution or liquidation, and usually has no
right to force the payment of dividends or the redemption of its stock.
Under the conventional conception of capital structure, this is viewed as a
natural balance. Common stockholders are thus regarded as the residual
claimants of a solvent corporation because both the dollar gained and the
dollar lost by the corporation at the margin belongs to them. Voting rights
are assigned to this class predominantly because they are the residual
claimants and therefore have the best incentives to promote firm value
maximization.3
Some financial contracts allow the investor to convert its security into
another security of the issuer. A distinction is often drawn between
upstream and downstream conversion based on whether the new security
enjoys higher or lower priority than the converted security. Although there
are many types of convertible financing,' we discuss only one instance
each of downstream and upstream convertible securities: subordinated debt
that is convertible into common stock and common stock that is puttable
in exchange for subordinated indebtedness. The former is far more widely
used.S Other than in closely held corporations, the right of a common
2. Alternatively, some bonds have reset provisions that raise coupon payments in response to
increased default risk, thereby effectively accelerating repayment of part of the loan. See, e.g., John
D. Finnerty, An Overview of Corporate Securities Innovation, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1992, at
23, 36.
3. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 63-72 (1991). Other explanations do not depend on the shareholders' upside
participation. They focus simply on the fact that shareholders have the lowest priority and are unable
to force payment of their claim and renegotiation of their contract without dissolution or liquidation.
see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 304-06 (1985).
4. John Finnerty describes a variety of securities with convertible features, including redeemable
preferred stock, convertible exchangeable preferred stock, preferred equity redemption cumulative stock
(PERCS), and liquid yield option notes (LYONS). Finnerty, supra note 2, at 33-36. In leveraged
transactions-such as buyouts, takeovers, and recapitalizations-mezzanine financing has been common
since the mid-1980s. It usually involves a fixed claim such as subordinated debt or preferred stock
combined with equity participation in the form of, for example, warrants, stock appreciation rights, or
common stock. See, e.g., John R. Willis & David A. Clark, An Introduction to Mezzanine Finance and
Private Equity, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1989, at 77.
5. During the period 1900 to 1988, an average of 9.3% of the total corporate debt issues were
convertible debt instruments, with the annual proportion ranging between 0% and 40.3%. F.C. JEN ET
1994] 1233
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stockholder to put its shares to the corporation for cash or debt is a
relatively recent innovation.6
While the terms of convertible debt are determined by contract, corporate
law constrains the use of puttable common stock, reflecting a greater
concern with upstream rather than downstream conversions. This concern
seems to be due to the attention paid to the direction of conversion rather
than to the state-contingent characteristics of the relevant instruments.
However, the distinction between upstream and downstream conversion is
largely the product of the historical dominance of the debt and equity
paradigms in finance, and it is of limited analytical use. Rather, consistent
with the taxonomy suggested at the outset, hybrid securities such as
convertibles should be examined for their state-contingent combination of
features.
In general, a holder of either type of convertible instrument will delay
its decision to exercise its conversion until the moment before the right
expires.7 In insolvent states, the priority of these hybrids is clear and
unique, regardless of the direction of the conversion: both rank as
(typically subordinated) debt claims. The only difference is that the
puttable stockholder must take the affirmative step of conversion to assert
that priority. In at least some solvent states, investors in either type of
hybrid are entitled to share in the residue of the firm. Given these
similarities, the relevant inquiry is not the direction of conversion. Rather,
the focus of analysis should be: (1) efficiency gains yielded by the
AL., CONVERTIBLE BOND FINANCING: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COSTS OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND
GROWTH FUNDING NEEDS (State University of New York at Buffalo School of Management, Working
Paper No. 765, 1993). In a sample of 497 debt offerings made by industrial firms during 1964-1982,
75 were convertible debt issues. B. Espen Eckbo, Valuation Effects of Corporate Debt Offerings, 15
J. FIN. ECON. 119, 127 (1986).
6. Nevertheless, Allen and Gale suggest that upstream conversions have a long history:
In the seventeenth century, a number of English finns undertook conversions to benefit
particular shareholders. For example, in 1631 King Charles I was allowed to convert his
shares in the New River Company into debt when the company did not do as well as
expected. In 1724 stockholders in the York Buildings Company converted half their shares
into debt that had equal priority with the firm's existing debt.
FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK SHARING 12 (1994).
7. In the absence of call provisions, interest, or dividend payments, there is no reason for the
convertible securityholder to give up the valuable option to convert before maturity. Convertible
debtholders, however, may choose to exercise their conversion option before its maturity date if the
dividend yield on the stock is sufficiently higher than the coupon rate on the bond. See, e.g., Kenneth
B. Dunn & Kenneth M. Eades, Voluntary Conversion of Convertible Securities and the Optimal Call
Strategy, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 273 (1989) (exploring the interaction between the investors' conversion
strategy and the firm's decision to call the bonds).
[VOL. 72:1231
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combination of a priority claim in bad times and participation in the residue
in good times;' (2) the effect on these gains of the legal restrictions
imposed by corporate law on puttable stock; and (3) the concerns, if any,
raised by the packaging of the state-contingent structure of financial claims
with the governance features of puttable stock, namely voting rights.
Part II of this Article discusses the gains yielded by convertible debt
financing. Convertible debt can act as a signal of favorable private
information and can mitigate the incentives of shareholders to promote
excessive risk taking by the firm. Part III describes puttable stock and the
legal regulation that bears on it. The regulation of puttable stock ranges
from prohibition to the requirement that the firm be solvent after the
exercise of the put. Part IV compares convertible debt and puttable stock.
In the absence of legal restrictions, a firm may structure puttable stock to
replicate the state-contingent financial claims of convertible debt. The
difference in the direction of the conversion option is of no consequence.
As a result, the issuance of puttable stock might be explained as yielding
the same gains as those identified in the discussion of convertible debt in
Part II.
Part V discusses the effect of the mildest form of legal restrictions on
puttable stock, the solvency requirement, on these potential gains. This
restriction dampens the signalling function that is otherwise served by
puttable stock and has, at best, a mixed effect on the mitigation of risk-
taking incentives by shareholders of the firm. Finally, we suggest that the
state-contingent structure of either convertible bond or puttable stock claims
causes the holders of these claims to exhibit extreme risk preference when
their conversion options are at or near the money. In this interval of firm
value, convertible bondholders have little control over firm decisions while
puttable stockholders may be able to exercise voting rights. The voting
rights held by risk-preferring puttable stockholders counteract the beneficial
effect of the issuance of puttable stock on the risk-taking incentives of
other common stockholders. In the end, the firm issuing puttable stock is
likely to take more risk than a similar firm issuing convertible debt, and
may be no better in this regard than a firm issuing ordinary common stock
instead.
8. An interesting question is why secured or senior debt convertible into common stock is not
observed. The combination of high priority with residual claim may be evolving, however, in several
different forms. For example, in 1990, Brooke Group Ltd. issued contingent value rights (CVRs) which
are senior secured obligations secured by cash, government bonds, and other securities. See infra note
36. In many cases, puttable stock itself may have de facto priority due to the short maturity of the put
and its redemption for cash or short-term notes.
19941 1235
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II. THEORIES OF CONVERTIBLE DEBT
The most prominent explanations for convertible debt suggest that it
reduces the costs of information asymmetries and financial agency
problems.9 Myers and Majluf demonstrate that, if there is significant
private information about the value of the firm, the issuance of equity is
viewed by the market as information that the firm's equity is overvalued.'"
Therefore, a firm with favorable private information may prefer to finance
its new projects by issuing debt rather than equity. In particular, the firm
may choose to issue short-term debt that matures at the time the favorable
information is expected to be revealed to the market." At that time, the
firm may refinance on better terms either by borrowing at a lower rate or
by issuing equity at a higher price. Like short-term debt, convertible debt
also defers the sale of equity until private information is revealed to the
9. The argument that financial innovation helps to complete financial markets is an uneasy case
at best when the novel security can be priced by equating it to a combination of existing securities. See
Nils H. Hakansson, The Fantastic World of Finance: Progress and the Free Lunch, 14 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 717, 722-24 (1979). It may be, however, that the firm can combine existing
claims to satisfy investor tastes at a lower 6ost than financial intermediaries providing this service. This
suggests a transaction cost explanation for hybrid instruments. See Robert C. Merton, On the
Application of the Continuous-Time Theory of Finance to Financial Intermediation and Insurance, 14
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 225 (July 1989) (setting forth a transaction cost explanation
for the role of intermediaries in financial derivatives markets). The development by Merrill Lynch of
liquid yield option notes (LYONs), which are puttable convertible zero coupon bonds, seems to have
been motivated by such an attempt to provide retail investors with an attractive package of debt and
stock options. See John J. McConnell & Eduardo S. Schwartz, The Origin of LYONs: A Case Study
in Financial Innovation, J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Winter 1992, at 40,41-42. Other explanations suggest
that innovations are motivated by the minimization of private costs of regulation (particularly tax). See,
e.g., Robert C. Merton, The Financial System and Economic Performance, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 263,
264-72 (1990).
10. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When
Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. EcoN. 187, 188, 209-10 (1984). Given
this information effect, Myers suggests a pecking order for outside financing in ascending order of risk:
debt, hybrids such as convertibles, and finally equity. Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle,
39 J. FIN. 575, 581-85, 589-90 (1984). This pecking order is consistent with empirical results on the
effect of the announcement of public issues of equity, convertible debt and straight debt on firm stock
prices. See Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Equity Issues and Offering Dilutidn, 15 J. FIN.
ECON. 61, 70-71 (1986) (reporting -3.2% two-day announcement period equity returns in response to
the issuance of seasoned equity); Eckbo, supra note 5, at 134 (reporting -1.70% announcement period
returns for convertible debt, and returns that were not significantly different from zero for straight debt).
11. See Mark J. Flannery, Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice, 41 J. FIN. 19
(1986) (asserting that issuing short-term debt tells the market that insiders view the firm's prospects
optimistically); Douglas W. Diamond, Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk, 106 Q.J. EcoN. 709
(1991) (arguing that a borrower is more likely to choose short-term debt if it has favorable information
that, once revealed to the market, will allow refinancing at a lower rate).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/30
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market.' 2  However, while short-term debt has a definite maturity,
convertible debt may define periods within which the holder may convert
and the issuer may force conversion by exercising its call privilege.
Therefore, the time at which the favorable information is revealed does not
have to be predicted with as much precision when convertible, rather than
short-term, debt is used to defer the issuance of equity.
The informational advantages of short-term or convertible debt financing
must be weighed against the risk that the borrower may be unable to
refinance the debt when it matures or to meet periodic coupon obligations
during the term of the debt. 3 This risk depends on the financial condition
of the firm and may therefore suggest a signalling role for the use of
convertible debt. Jeremy Stein proposes the following separating
equilibrium.'4 High-quality firms issue long-term debt to benefit from the
informational gains identified above. Given their excellent financial
condition, the expected marginal costs of financial distress are trivial.
Low-quality firms issue equity because the expected financial distress costs
from debt financing outweigh the gains from mimicking higher quality
firms. Medium-quality firms have nontrivial concerns about financial
distress and signal that their equity is undervalued by issuing debt with a
conversion price higher than the current market price." Unless the stock
12. Surveys of firms which have issued convertibles indicate that in many cases convertibles are
issued with the intent to eventually shift debt into equity when stock prices rise. See J. Ronald
Hoffmeister, Use of Convertible Debt in the Early 1970s: A Reevaluation of Corporate Motives, Q.
REV. ECON. & BUS., Summer 1977, at 23, 28 (reporting that 64% of respondents cite the possibility
of shifting debt into equity as one of two main reasons for issuing convertibles); Eugene F. Brigham,
An Analysis of Convertible Debentures: Theory and Some Empirical Evidence, 21 J. FIN. 35, 51 (1966)
(reporting that 73% of respondents claim that they were primarily interested in obtaining equity when
using convertibles). In a sample of convertible bonds studied by Asquith, approximately two-thirds of
these bonds were eventually converted into equity. Paul Asquith, Convertible Debt: A Dynamic Test
of Call Policy (MIT Sloan School of Management, Working Paper, 1991).
13. Several authors have commented on the tradeoff between the concern about financial distress
caused by taking on debt and the discount on equity issuance. See, e.g., Bradford Cornell & Alan C.
Shapiro, Financing Corporate Growth, J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Summer 1988, at 6, 15-16 (regarding
the financing of growth firms); Diamond, supra note 11.
14. See Jeremy C. Stein, Convertible Bonds as Backdoor Equity Financing, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 3
(1992). Constantinides and Grundy model a different separating equilibrium produced by a financing
policy that combines the issuance of convertible debt with an open market stock repurchase. Unlike
Stein, they assume no financial distress costs. George M. Constantinides & Bruce D. Grundy, Optimal
Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals, 2 REv. FIN. STUD. 445 (1989).
15. Stein argues "that companies may find convertible bonds an attractive middle ground between
the negative informational consequences associated with an equity issue and the potential for costly
financial distress associated with a debt issue." Stein, supra note 14, at 19. Stein also shows that short-
term debt will not have the same effect as convertible debt if there is a "steady-state level of
information asymmetry" concerning the firm's quality. Id. at 9-10, 19-20. In that case, the medium-
quality firm may decide not to refinance its debt with an equity issue if at the maturity date of the debt
1237
Washington University Open Scholarship
1238 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 72:1231
price rises to make conversion attractive, the firm will be saddled with
additional leverage that increases the expected cost of financial distress. If
the equity price does rise, the issuer can typically get rid of the debt by
exercising its call privilege and thereby forcing the conversion into equity.
On the basis of its favorable private information, the firm expects that the
debtholder will choose to convert. This theory predicts that convertibles
tend to be issued by highly levered and high-growth companies, which are
likely to be characterized both by information asymmetries and financial
distress concerns.
The benefit from deferring the issuance of equity through convertible
debt financing is qualified by the effect of the firm's exercise of its call
privilege. A firm that calls its convertible debt in order to force conversion
communicates to the market its expectation that impending difficulties may
make the firm's debt obligations more difficult to service or that its equity
is now overvalued. Indeed, this information effect may explain the
negative stock price reaction to call announcements.' 6 Therefore, the
issuance of callable convertible debt may not avoid, but rather simply
postpone, the Myers and Majluf information effect of equity financing
unless the firm refrains from calling the debt and waits for the holder to
convert.17 However, the delay in calling the debt has a cost: the risk of
its private information is optimistic. Id. at 20. Thus, it is important that the firm issue a debt security
with a contractual precommitment to issue equity.
16. See Wayne H. Mikkelson, Convertible Calls and Security Returns, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1981)
(reporting that announcement of convertible bond calls are accompanied by an average 2% decrease in
stock prices); Ajai K. Singh et al., Underwritten Calls of Convertible Bonds, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 173
(1991) (stating that the negative stock price reaction is larger when the conversion value is near the call
price at the time of the conversion-forcing call). In contrast, but consistent with the information story
of calls, Cowan, Nayar, and Singh find a positive announcement effect of calls of out-of-the-money
conversion options. While the firm pays a premium to the bondholder in this case, the action serves
as a signal that separates the announcement from the pool of call announcements that imply bad news.
Arnold R. Cowan et al., Calls of Out-of-the-Money Convertible Bonds, FIN. MGMT., Winter 1993, at
106.
17. Under perfect market assumptions, a firm should call a convertible bond as soon as its
conversion value exceeds its call price. However, firms typically delay calling convertible bonds until
the conversion value is at least 20% above the call price. Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr.,
Convertible Debt: Corporate Call Policy and Voluntary Conversion, 46 J. FIN. 1273, 1277 (1991).
Harris and Raviv propose a sequential signalling model in which calls convey unfavorable information,
while delaying conveys favorable information (i.e., that managers expect the stock price to continue
rising). Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, A Sequential Signalling Model of Convertible Debt Call Policy,
40 J. FIN. 1263 (1985).
A number of other explanations for call delays have been advanced. Constantinides and Grundy
argue that call delays signal future dividend increases. GEORGE CONSTANTINIDES & BRUCE GRUNDY,
CALL AND CONVERsION OF CONVERTIBLE CORPORATE BONDS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (Center for
Research in Security Prices, University of Chicago, Working Paper No. 180, 1987). Jaffee and Shlcifer
argue that the call notice period (typically 30 days, during which the bondholders may decide whether
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/30
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financial distress until conversion, which the holder usually has the
incentive to defer until the last possible moment.
Whereas information theories view convertible debt as deferred equity,
agency cost explanations view it as a debt instrument with an option to
convert to equity. Unlike long-term debtholders, convertible debt investors
are relatively insensitive to the variance of the firm's returns because they
can participate in the firm's profits through their conversion privilege."8
Furthermore, this participation in equity dampens the incentives of a
solvent debtor to increase the riskiness of its projects and thereby reduces
related agency costs of debt (e.g., the cost of covenants and monitoring for
all debt classes). 9 Indeed, if a firm wishes to defer the issuance of equity
for the reasons given above, it may prefer to do so through convertible debt
rather than short-term debt because of the concerns even short-term lenders
have about risk alteration. However, the agency cost savings of convertible
debt are easily overstated since it does not prevent the exacerbation of risk
alteration incentives when the debtor is insolvent or near insolvency. At
that point the equityholders no longer have any liquidation interest in the
firm and prefer any project that offers them a chance at positive value, even
if they may have to share the profit with the convertible bondholders.20
to convert or to tender the bonds for cash) potentially exposes the firm to financial distress costs since
the firm's stock price may decline during this period and the firm may be forced to redeem the bond.
Dwight Jaffee & Andrei Shleifer, Costs of Financial Distress, Delayed Calls of Convertible Bonds, and
the Role ofInvestment Banks, 63 J. Bus., at S 107, S 108 (1990). Asquith and Mullins attribute the delay
to differences in tax rates between the firm and the investors. Asquith & Mullins, supra, at 1287.
18. Brennan and Schwartz suggest that convertible debt removes the significance of uncertainty
concerning the risk of the firm because its value is relatively invariant to firm risk. When the firm
invests in a high-risk project, the value of the conversion option rises and offsets some of the decline
in the value of the fixed claim. The authors suggest an information-based theory along the same lines.
If the market overestimates the risk of a small-growth company, it will undervalue the company's
straight debt but overvalue the conversion feature. Michael J. Brennan & Eduardo S. Schwartz, The
Case for Convertibles, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1988, at 56. Similarly, Brennan and Kraus
suggest that the conversion ratio and the face value of a convertible bond signal to investors the firm's
private information about its risk. They predict that the firm's risk is a decreasing function of the
conversion ratio and an increasing function of the face value of the bond. Michael J. Brennan & Alan
Kraus, Efficient Financing Under Asymmetric Information, 42 J. FIN. 1225 (1987). Brennan and Her
provide empirical support for this proposition. Michael J. Brennan & Constance Her, Convertible
Bonds: Test of a Financial Signalling Model (UCLA School of Management, Working Paper 12-93,
1993).
19. See, e.g., Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis
of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979); Richard C. Green, Investment Incentives, Debt, and
Warrants, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 115 (1984). Convertible debt does not mitigate another agency problem
associated with leverage, namely underinvestment or debt overhang. See generally Stewart C. Myers,
Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977).
20. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 439, 463 (1992).
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III. PUTrABLE/REDEEMABLE COMMON STOCK
Subject to legal and contractual restrictions, a firm may purchase its
issued stock for cash or its own debt. The notion of a corporation agreeing
to repurchase its own stock at some time in the future is not new,
particularly in closely held corporations. Owners of closely held corpora-
tions often wish to restrict the transfer of shares to preserve the character
of their corporation. Yet, such restrictions deprive the stock of liquidity.
To compensate, corporations enter into buyout agreements under which the
shareholder agrees to sell and the corporation agrees to purchase the firm's
stock on the occurrence of specified events in the future, particularly the
death of the shareholder. Similar agreements are used in connection with
the issuance of common stock to employees. To motivate its employees
to work hard and to remain with the corporation, the corporation may
permit them to share in any appreciation in firm value by issuing stock to
them. Yet, by contract, the firm and the employee agree that, on
termination, the employee will sell the shares to the firm. In the context
of both the employee and the investor in the closely held firm, the price
may be fixed or it may be based on a variable benchmark that reflects
changes in the value of the shares.
Until recently, shareholder rights to put common stock back to the
corporation were granted only through privately negotiated agreement
between the shareholder and the corporation. Most corporate statutes did
not allow firms to embed such put rights in stock descriptions in the
articles of incorporation. This limitation gave rise to two problems. First,
it was much more costly for a public company to grant these rights by
contract to a class of dispersed shareholders. Second, the rights were not
as visible to the public as they would be if revealed in the articles. One of
the innovations of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA)
was to permit the articles of incorporation to provide that a class of stock
is redeemable at the instance of the shareholder." Many states have
21. Under § 6.01(c)(2), the articles may authorize one or more classes of shares that:
are redeemable or convertible as specified in the articles of incorporation (i) at the option of
the corporation, the shareholder, or another person or upon the occurrence of a designated
event; (ii) for cash, indebtedness, securities, or other property; (iii) in a designated amount or
in an amount determined in accordance with a designated formula or by reference to extrinsic
data or events.
MODEL BUSINEss CORP. AcT ANN. § 6.01(c) (1993). See also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr ANN.
§ 6.0 1(c) cmt. (1985); Bayless Manning, Assets in and Assets out: Chapter VI of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, 63 TEx L. REv. 1527, 1531-32 (1985).
[VOL. 72:1231
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adopted this provision,22 and New York and Delaware have different
provisions that also permit the issuance of common shares redeemable at
the option of the shareholder.23 Statutes that allow common shares to be
redeemable at the option of the shareholder typically also allow common
stock to be exchanged, at the shareholder's option, for debt of the
corporation (upstream conversion) because the new indebtedness is no more
prejudicial to other investors than payment in cash.24 However, any
redemption or conversion from common equity to debt is subject to the
restrictions on distributions that are included in the corporate statutes to
protect creditors.
Corporate statutes prohibit the purchase or redemption by a corporation
of its own shares if, after the transaction, the firm would be insolvent in
either the equity or balance sheet sense.25 Equity solvency requires that
the corporation be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual
course of business. For the purpose of calculating balance sheet solvency,
shares with dissolution rights senior to the redeemed shares are typically
22. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-638 (Michie 1990). See generally MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT ANN. § 6.01 and commentary at 305-27 (1993).
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(b) (1991) (allowing the stock of any class of series to be made
subject to redemption by the corporation at the option of the stockholder provided that (with three
exceptions) at the time of redemption the corporation has outstanding shares of at least one class or
series of stock with full voting powers and not subject to redemption); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 512(a)-
(c) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1994) (allowing a class of stock to be redeemable if there is another class
not subject to redemption). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-6(l) (West Supp. 1994), which permits
redeemable common shares and thereby "affords a technique superior to the present practice of reliance
on 'buy-sell' agreements between shareholders and the corporation," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-6(3),
1968 Commissioner's Comment (West 1969).
24. See MODEL BUSNESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 6.01(c)(2) (1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(b),
(e) (1991). But see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 519(a)(1) (McKinney 1986); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
ANN. § 15(e) (1971) (providing that shares may be convertible into any other class except a class
having superior priority as to dividends or distribution of assets upon liquidation). Cf. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 402 (West 1990) (neither prohibiting nor directly addressing upstream conversion).
25. For example, § 6.40(c) of the Model Business Corporations Act provides:
No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect:
(1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual
course of business; or
(2) the corporation's total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus
(unless the articles of incorporation permit otherwise) the amount that would be needed,
if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the distribution, to satisfy the
preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders whose preferential rights are superior
to those receiving the distribution.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 6.40(c) (1993). See also Manning, supra note 21, at 1530. Most
statutes hold directors jointly and severally liable for any improper distributions, but allow them to sue
the recipient shareholders for contribution. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.33(b)(2)
(1993) (providing that a director is entitled to contribution from each shareholder for the amount the
shareholder accepted knowing the distribution violated § 6.40 or the articles of incorporation).
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treated as if they were liabilities. These are the only solvency requirements
that the RMBCA imposes on firms purchasing or redeeming stock. Other
statutes are more restrictive. For example, Delaware prohibits the
corporation from purchasing or redeeming its stock when its capital is
impaired or would thereby become impaired.26
The corporation's debt may be used to redeem its common shares, or the
common shares may be expressly exchangeable into debt instruments.27
In either case, the firm may issue debt to shareholders exercising their put
only if the solvency tests are satisfied at the time of the issue. If they are
not, the debt is not an enforceable claim in a subsequent bankruptcy
proceeding.28 In the past, a number of courts have held that the firm also
must be solvent when it makes payments under this debt.29 However,
more recent statutes (notably the RMBCA) provide that the requirements
for repurchase or redemption must be satisfied only at the time the debt is
issued.30 The argument in favor of a one-time test is compelling: if the
corporation is entitled to make a cash distribution, the creditors would be
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a)(1) (1991). In New York, the firm may redeem out of surplus
if it would remain solvent after the redemption, and may redeem out of stated capital if it can remain
solvent and if net assets would not be reduced below the stated capital after the redemption. N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 513(a)-(c) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1994). California law provides that a distribution
(which includes purchase or redemption of shares) may not be made unless either (a) the corporation
has retained earnings at least equal to the amount of the distribution or (b) after the distribution, the
corporation would have both (I) total assets equal to or exceeding 1 times its liabilities (as defined)
and (2) current assets at least equal to its current liabilities. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(a), (b) (West
1990).
27. See supra note 21.
28. See Reiner v. Washington Plate Glass Co., 711 F.2d 414, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that
where the corporation had inadequate surplus at the time of the stock repurchase, the security interest
granted failed with the underlying obligation). See also In re Flying Mailmen Service, 539 F.2d 866,
870-72 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.); In re Bell Tone Records, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 806, 810 (D.N.J. 1949).
Yet, a few courts have permitted former shareholders to recover ahead of creditors who had knowledge
of the repurchase at the time they advanced funds to the corporation. See, e.g., Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy
Printing Co., 153 N.W.2d 241, 245-47 (Minn. 1967); Cross v. Beguelin, 169 N.E. 378, 379 (N.Y.
1929). For a critique of the surplus test and creditors with knowledge of repurchase, see David R.
Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 HARv. L. REV. 303, 315-16 (1965).
29. See, e.g., Neimark v. Mel Kramer Sales, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 278, 283 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that insolvency test must be applied both at time of purchase and when each installment
payment is made). See also In re Flying Mailmen Service, 539 F.2d at 869 (regarding New York law);
In re Trimble Co., 339 F.2d 838, 842-43 (3d Cir. 1964) (regarding Pennsylvania law). See MODEL
BusiNEss CORP. Acr ANN. § 6 (1971) (amended 1980) ("No purchase of or payment for its own shares
shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would
make it insolvent.').
30. See, e.g., MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT ANN. § 6.40(e), (g) (1993) (stating that legality of
distribution is measured at the time the debt is incurred, except when debt is issued under the special
provision of subsection (g)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a)(l) (requiring that capital not be impaired
at the time the debt is delivered by the corporation nor become impaired as a result of such delivery).
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no worse off if the firm postponed payment by issuing debt instead."
Once issued, the debt is treated like any other indebtedness of the
corporation and payment of the debt by an insolvent corporate debtor may
be subject to the normal bankruptcy preference rules.32
Thus, while the historical antipathy in corporate law toward upstream
conversion has softened in many states, significant restrictions remain.
Even in the most permissive statutes, the exercise of a right to put a stock
to the issuer is impeded by corporate statutory rules when the firm is
insolvent or on the verge of insolvency, either in the equity or balance
sheet sense.33 As we demonstrate in the next part, puttable stock can
replicate the financial claims of convertible debt and might thereby serve
the same purposes as convertible debt: namely, the resolution of informa-
tion asymmetries and the mitigation of agency problems. Indeed, there
have been cases in which puttable stock has been issued by public
corporations apparently to signal favorable information to capital markets.
However, while a convertible debtholder may choose not to convert and
hold on to this claim during financial distress, the puttable stockholder may
be precluded by law from exercising its contractual right to exchange its
common equity interest for a fixed debt claim. We suggest in Part V that
the legal constraints on the exercise of stockholder puts when the firm is
in financial distress may undermine the signalling of favorable private
information. The effect of puttable stock on the risk taking of the firm is
3 1. The issuance of debt rather than cash to shareholders may, however, raise agency costs by
allowing management to retain free cash with which they may misbehave. See generally Michael C.
Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323
(1986).
32. I1 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
33. Fraudulent conveyance provisions add little, if anything, to the restrictions placed on the
exercise of stock puts or redemptions by corporate statutes. In states where only solvency is required
by corporate law, fraudulent conveyance rules may have some effect when the debtor business is left
with unreasonably small capital after the transaction. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B) (1988); UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)2) (1985); UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4-6
(1985). However, courts have tended to construe this condition narrowly. See Richard 0. Kummert,
State Statutory Restrictions on Financial Distributions by Corporations to Shareholders (pt.2), 59
WASH. L. REV. 185, 278 n.419 (1984). Moreover, a fraudulent transfer or conveyance requires that the
debtor receive less than reasonably equivalent value or fair consideration. I 1 U.S.C. § 548 (1988). The
receipt of shares in a repurchase transaction is not a reasonably equivalent value for the issuance of a
note. See, e.g., In re Roco Corp., 21 B.R. 429, 434 (Bankr. Ist Cir. 1982); In re Louisiana Coatings,
Inc., 31 B.R. 688, 698 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1983); In re DeFeo Fruit Co., 24 B.R. 220, 225 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1982). However, value is defined in fraudulent conveyance statutes to include the satisfaction of
a present or antecedent debt. See II U.S.C. § 548(d)(2) (1988) (defining value); UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(a) (defining value); UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3(a)
(defining fair consideration). A strong argument can be made that the purchase obligation of the debtor
pursuant to a put written to a common shareholder is an antecedent contingent debt.
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also complicated by these legal constraints and by the voting rights, if any,
that accompany the stock.
IV. COMPARING CONVERTIBLE DEBT AND PUTTABLE STOCK
We noted in Part III that the right of a common stockholder to put her
stock back to the corporation is often used to compensate for the lack of
liquidity in the stock of closely held corporations, particularly when the
transfer of shares is restricted. The use of publicly issued puttable stock is
illustrated in the following example.34 In 1984, Arley Merchandise
Corporation, a privately owned manufacturer of draperies and upholstery,
had enjoyed continuous profitability and sharply increasing earnings over
the previous two years. Arley wanted to raise $6 million through an initial
public offering of shares to repay some of its debt and to finance future
growth. However, there was a significant discrepancy between the price
per share that Arley's owners thought was appropriate ($8 per share) and
the price that the underwriter felt would be marketable ($6 per share). The
gap was due partly to the expectation of Arley's owners that earnings
would continue to rise at an annual rate exceeding 150% and partly to the
underwriter's perception of a decline in investor enthusiasm for new issues
of common stock of small firms. To bridge the gap, Arley's investment
banker marketed units each consisting of one share of the common stock
and one right to sell the common stock to the company for $8 in cash or
notes during a fifteen-business-day period beginning two years from the
date of issuance (essentially a European put option). The company agreed
to announce, no later than 60 days prior to the commencement of this
period, whether it chose to pay for the stock in cash or in ten-year senior
subordinated notes bearing interest payable quarterly at 128% of the ten-
year Treasury rate.35
34. The example is from a Harvard Business School case study on Arley Merchandise Corporation,
No. 9-287-063 (1987) and Andrew H. Chen & John w. Kensinger, Uncommon Equity, J. APPLIED
CoRP. Fn4., Spring 1992, at 36, 37-38. Other instances of puttable stock issues may be motivated by
different rationales. For example, in the mid-1980s, Smith International acquired shares of Gearhart
Industries with the intent to attempt a hostile takeover. The parties subsequently negotiated a deal under
which Gearhart agreed to buy back $80 million of stock from Smith at $15 per share (which was
significantly higher than the market price). Gearhart was bound by contractual limitations on its ability
to borrow new funds and did not have enough cash to perform its promise to purchase. Therefore, it
financed the purchase by issuing puttable stock-packages of common shares with rights to sell the
shares back to the company at a guaranteed price (which varied with the redemption date), Ann
Monroe, Gearhart Files $90 Million Offer of Stock, Rights, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 1985, at A5.
Contingent value rights serve a similar function in takeovers or mergers. See infra note 36.
35. In fact, the stock traded in the range of $9 to $10 at the time the puts matured and they
expired without being exercised. Chen & Kensinger, supra note 34, at 37.
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To keep the discussion simple, suppose that the Arley puttable stock
could be exchanged for a ten-year senior subordinated discount note, rather
than a note paying periodic interest. A senior subordinated convertible
discount note with the same maturity could yield the same financial claim
as this puttable stock.36 The equivalence of a convertible note and
puttable stock follows from put-call parity, a well known identity for
European options. 7 Applying this parity relationship to Arley's securities,
the combined value of the stock and the in-the-money European put (with
a strike price of $8) must be equivalent to the value of a discount note
together with an out-of-the-money European call option with the same
strike price (i.e., an option to convert the note with principal value of $8
for one share of Arley). This relationship holds at all times regardless of
the value of Arley's stock, provided that the stock does not pay dividends
and the notes do not pay periodic interest.S If the value of the firm
yields a market share price over $8 at the maturity date of the options,
investors in either instrument will choose to hold stock: the puttable
stockholder will not exercise her put and the convertible noteholder will
convert. If the market value of the common stock is less than $8 per share,
they will both hold debt in the firm: the puttable stockholder will exercise
her put and the convertible noteholder will not convert.
In the absence of any restrictions on the exercise of the stock put, the
two investors should be in the same financial position in the event of the
firm's insolvency: they have equivalent senior subordinated claims to the
36. Other mechanisms are used to achieve similar effects. Contingent value rights (CVRs) have
evolved since the mid-1980s to provide a floor for the value of a shareholder's investment. The issuer
of a CVR promises to pay the holder the difference between a stated target price and the market price
at a specified exercise date (or the average price over a specified period). The amount of this obligation
is usually capped by an upper limit. See MARION LABORATORIES, INC., PROXY STATEMENT, Filing Date
11/02/89, Document Date 10/30/89, SEC File No. 1-5829, at 4 (regarding the merger of Merrel Dow
Pharmaceutical and Marion Laboratories, Inc.); RORER GROUP INC., PROXY STATEMENT, Filing Date
3/22191, Document Date 6/29/90, SEC File No. 1-5851, at 2 (regarding the acquisition of Rorer
Pharmaceutical by Rhone Poulenc), BROOKE GROUP LTD., FORMI 1O-Q, Filing Date 11/19/90, Document
Date 9/30/1990, SEC File No. 1-5759, at I 1 (regarding the acquisition of Brooke Partners, L.P. by
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company in a reverse subsidiary merger). The most recent and most
publicized instance is the CVR component of Viacom's winning bid to buy Paramount
Communications' shares. See, e.g., Randall Smith & Laura Landro, Viacom Raises Paramount Bid to
S9.7 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1994, at A3; Randall Smith & Johnnie L. Roberts, Traders Say
Viacom 's Bid Has an Edge over QVC's in Contest for Paramount, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1994, at A4.
37. See Hans R. Stoll, The Relationship Between Put and Call Option Prices, 24 J. FIN. 801
(1969) (discussing the general put-call parity relationship).
38. See Andrew H. Chen & John W. Kensinger, Puttable Stock: A New Innovation in Equity
Financing, FN. MGMT., Spring 1988, at 27, 29-32. The relationship discussed in the text assumes that
the debt and stock do not pay interest or dividends and there is no call provision in the debt.
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firm's assets. This result, however, may not hold in the face of the legal
constraints described in Part III. Even under the most permissive state
corporation statutes, the firm would not be able to issue debt in return for
the investor's puttable shares if, after the transaction, the firm would be
insolvent in either the equity or balance sheet sense. 39 As a result, the
puttable stockholder's claim would not be recognized in bankruptcy. In
contrast, there is no legal barrier to the assertion of the debt claim of the
convertible noteholder against the insolvent firm. The source of the
difference in legal treatment appears to be the direction of the conversion.
The exercise of the common stockholder's put is viewed as bootstrapping
to higher ground as the firm sinks into insolvency. However, looking at
the direction of the conversion misses the point. In the cases of both
puttable stock (free of legal restriction) and convertible debt, the investor
pays for a combination of priority in bad times and a share of the residue
in good times, and the combination signals the firm's favorable information
about its future prospects. Therefore, the justification for restrictions on
upstream conversions to protect creditors must be found elsewhere. Several
features tend to accompany each type of security and may lead a firm to
prefer one over the other. In the remainder of the paper, we briefly
examine three factors that might affect a firm's choice between puttable
stock and convertible debt: (1) the payment obligations under each
instrument; (2) the characterization of puttable stock for accounting or
regulatory purposes; and (3) governance features.
A firm with strong prospects may nevertheless lack the cash flow to
service periodic interest payment obligations to its convertible debtholder.
Dividends to common stockholders are discretionary and therefore offer
more flexibility to the issuer. Therefore, an issuer might prefer puttable
common stock to avoid the burden of periodic cash payments that are
traditionally found in debt instruments. However, many new forms of debt
issues, such as zero coupon convertible debt (like LYONs) or pay-in-kind
debt, do not impose such obligations.4' These innovations demonstrate
that financial contracting flexibility blurs the conventional distinctions
between common stock and debt. Given that the direction of conversion
39. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
40. Pay-in-kind (or PIK) bonds do not have periodic cash interest payments, but instead increase
the principal value on which interest will eventually be paid. See, e.g., Robert M. Dammon et al., The
Relative Pricing of High-Yield Debt: The Case of RJR Nabisco Holdings Capital Corporation, 83 AM.
ECON. REV. 1090 (1993). Finnerty describes the design of adjustable rate convertible debt under which
interest is linked to the common dividend rate. The IRS, however, subsequently disallowed deduction
for those interest payments. Finnerty, supra note 2, at 33, 35.
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is not particularly informative, the focus of attention should be on the
components packages in each security rather than their characterization as
debt or equity.4
If, despite its similarity with convertible debt, puttable stock is disclosed
as equity in the issuer's financial statements, the firm's other present and
future creditors might mistakenly understate the firm's liabilities.42
Following the Arley Merchandise issue, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) ruled that stock puttable for cash or debt must be
treated as redeemable equity and represented as a liability. However, the
SEC does allow an issue of puttable stock to be disclosed as equity
financing if the issuer has the option to meet its obligation by issuing
common stock sufficient to bring the market value of its stock up to the
guaranteed value.43 Loan covenants typically restrict the amount of debt
a firm can issue, but not the issuance of puttable stock. Therefore, a firm
may issue puttable stock rather than convertible debt to circumvent this
type of prohibition.'
As puttable stock becomes more common, however, lenders are likely to
amend their covenants to restrict its use. Moreover, a simple restriction on
the amount of firm debt would probably constrain the firm's ability to meet
its obligation if the put were exercised. At least one court has held that a
stockholder cannot force the issuer to satisfy its obligation to redeem its
stock when such redemption would violate the terms of a trust indenture
41. Another apparent distinction between convertible debt and puttable stock is the call provision
that is typically found in convertible bonds. This provision allows the firm to force conversion of the
bond and thus remove the downside protection it provides to the investor. While puttable stock issues
do not currently have such a feature, it would be possible to build this feature into the security. This
could be achieved by allowing the firm the flexibility to decide the exercise date of the option rather
than forcing the firm to create a strictly European option. Contingent value rights have incorporated
this feature to a limited extent in that the firm may decide at a single point in time before the maturity
date whether to force exercise of the put option. See supra note 36. Alternatively, the puttable stock
could incorporate an "up-and-out" put option (a type of "barrier option") which is extinguished once
the value of the underlying stock reaches a particular barrier (e.g., 20% above the exercise price of the
option). See, e.g., Mark Rubinstein & Eric Reiner, Breaking Down the Barrier, RISK, Sept. 1991, at
28.
42. A variety of stakeholders and regulatory agencies rely on financial statements. Chen and
Kensinger argue that customers and suppliers, in particular, might regard puttable stock as equity and
consequently ignore or downplay its liability feature. Chen & Kensinger, supra note 38, at 36. The
accounting interpretation of hybrids has been the focus of increased scrutiny and discussion recently.
See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, DISCUSSION MEMORANDUM No. 94,
DISTINGUISHING B~mEEN LIABILITY AND EQUITY INSTRUMENTS AND ACCOUNTING FOR INSTRUMENTS
WITH CHARACTERISTICS OF BOTH (1990).
43. This was done in the Gearhart Industries issue. See supra note 34.
44. See Monroe, supra note 34, regarding the Gearhart puttable stock issue.
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issued before the redeemable stock.4 ' Therefore, while standard covenants
currently do not prohibit the issuance of puttable stock, they may otherwise
reduce its value to investors by limiting the circumstances in which the
firm is able to meet its obligations when the put is exercised. 6
V. SIGNALLING AND INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF PUTTABLE STOCK UNDER
LEGAL RESTRICTIONS
In Part II, we explained that convertible debt can provide a signal of
favorable private information and can mitigate the incentives of sharehold-
ers to induce their managers to take excessive risks. In the discussion in
this Part, we show that the legal restrictions on the use of puttable stock
undermine the ability of that security to yield similar benefits. We consider
the most permissive form of regulation that permits the issuance of puttable
stock but prohibits the exercise of the stockholder's put when the exercise
would cause the firm to be insolvent. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the effect
of this restriction on the payoffs to the holder of puttable stock and to other
stockholders. In Figure 1, the firm has issued convertible debt, which is
equivalent to puttable stock in the absence of legal restrictions. The Figure
shows the payoffs to securityholders at the maturity date of the convertible
debt. In Figure 2, the firm has issued puttable stock subject to the solvency
requirement stated above. In both figures, we assume that the firm has
other debt that ranks higher in priority than either the convertible debt or
45. See Alco Prods., Inc. v. White Motor Int'l Corp., No. 76 Civ. 5090-CLB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8,
1978). However, if payment is made to the shareholder in violation of debt covenants, the amount paid
may not be recovered from the shareholder unless it is a fraudulent conveyance or preference
recoverable by a bankruptcy trustee. See supra note 33.
46. Another factor in the choice between convertible debt and puttable stock may be the tax
treatment. Convertible debt has the advantage of the tax deductibility of interest payments. Miller,
however, has argued that there may be an equilibrium amount of debt outstanding in the economy
which is determined by relative corporate and personal tax rates, such that, on the margin, issuing debt
does not necessarily confer a tax advantage on the firm. Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN.
261, 266-72 (1977). The fact that most convertible debt is held by tax-exempt investors suggests,
however, that these debt issues are not the "marginal" issues which are bought by taxable investors, and
thus there may indeed be a tax advantage despite the differential taxation of stock and bond income at
the personal level. Finnerty, supra note 2, at 33 (stating that 80-90% of convertible bond investors are
tax-exempt). The dividends from puttable stock may yield a more favorable tax result than interest in
cases in which the issuer is not taxable or has accumulated operating losses and the investor is a
corporation which receives favorable tax treatment of dividend income. This suggests that puttable
stock may lead to a lower cost of capital than convertible debt in some cases.
There may be other institutional factors that influence the choice between convertible debt and
puttable stock. For example, some investors (e.g., financial institutions) are restricted as to the amount
of common stock they may hold. However, Brennan and Schwartz argue that firms supply enough
convertibles in aggregate to satisfy the demand of those investors, so that there are no scarcity rents.
Brennan & Schwartz, supra note 18.
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the notes for which the puttable stock may be exchanged (hereinafter the
"notes"). We label the firm value at which the firm can pay all its debts
other than the convertible debt or the notes, A, the firm value at which the
firm can pay all its liabilities, B, and the value at which the conversion
options are at the money, C.
Figure 1: Convertible Debt (or puttable stock without restrictions)
Conv.
Dcbt
Value
Equity
Value
BV
B C
'V,
Figure 2: Puttable stock subject to legal restriction
B'< x
B C
Note: VF is firm value net of all other debt.
Puttable
Stock
Value
Equity
Value
A B
VA A
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The payoffs in Figures 1 and 2 differ in two regions: (a) when firm value
lies between A and B, and (b) when it exceeds C. When the firm has
convertible debt outstanding (Figure 1), the firm is insolvent in the interval
between A and B and the convertible debtholders capture marginal
increases in the value of the firm. Where the firm has puttable stock
outstanding (Figure 2), the puttable stockholders are prevented by law from
converting their interests into debt claims in the interval between A and B.
Therefore, they share any marginal gains with the other equityholders.
Because the puttable shareholders are restricted from converting their shares
to debt between A and B, investors would pay less for puttable shares
subject to the restriction than without it. Thus, the firm must issue more
puttable shares to raise a given amount of new capital. Therefore, the
interest of the equityholders is diluted to a greater extent in Figure 2 than
Figure 1 when firm value exceeds C. The dilution is indicated by a lower
slope of nonputtable equity value as a function of firm value: ' < X.
As a result of the restrictions on puttable stock, equityholders share in
the value of the firm between A and B in Figure 2. Their participation
alters the signalling and incentive gains that would be available if puttable
stock were free from restrictions and could replicate the payoffs yielded by
convertible debt. In Part II, we explained that the issuance of convertible
debt can serve as a signal of favorable private information because of the
financial distress costs that would fall on the firm if it could not force the
conversion to equity by calling the debt. If the law prevents puttable
stockholders from converting into fixed claims when such a conversion
would place the firm in financial distress, puttable stock cannot serve the
same signalling function.
The effect on the risk-taking incentives of the firm's stockholders is less
clear because it is contingent on the value of the firm. In the interval
between A and B, stockholders have less of an incentive to induce the firm
to take large risks if the firm has puttable stock rather than convertible
stock outstanding because the equityholders have a stake in the firm in the
former case (Figure 2). However, for firm values slightly higher than B,
stockholders certainly have a greater incentive to take risks in Figure 2
because the value of their interest may increase even if firm value decreases
below B. As firm value approaches C, however, the stockholders become
risk averse. The rate at which they develop risk aversion is greater in
Figure 2 than Figure 1 because the stockholders must give a larger share
of the gains to the puttable stockholders. Therefore, the effect of the
issuance of puttable stock under the solvency restrictions on the risk
preferences of existing shareholders is contingent on firm value.
To observers of the debate over the merits of Chapter 11 of the U.S.
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Bankruptcy Code, this tension should be familiar. Chapter 11 is often
criticized because it allows managers to delay the reorganization and to
retain some control over the firm's investment decisions. Although the
firm is insolvent, its creditors may offer to give equityholders some value
in the reorganized corporation in exchange for more efficient investment
decisions during the reorganization and a speedier resolution of the case.
The result is a deviation from absolute priority in the confirmed reorganiza-
tion plan. By giving equity a stake in an insolvent firm, the bankruptcy
process discourages excessive risk taking when the firm is insolvent.47 On
the other hand, the reallocation of value in bankruptcy increases the
incentive to take risks when the firm is comfortably solvent because
shareholders can recoup from debtholders some of the losses from risky
investments if insolvency and bankruptcy result.48 In addition, to raise
any given amount of capital, the firm must sell debt of greater face value
under a regime that deviates from the absolute priority rule. As a result,
the firm is more highly levered and therefore has an even greater risk-
taking incentive while solvent.
In sum, the solvency restriction on puttable stock yields a state-
contingent structure of payoffs that undermines the signal of favorable
private information through the issuance of puttable stock. The restriction
does not seem to systematically improve the risk-taking incentives of the
firm's common stockholders beyond the gains that would be achieved from
issuing convertible debt or puttable stock without restrictions. Indeed, to
see the full picture of the effect of the issuance of puttable stock on firm
risk taking, we must also examine the incentives of the holders of either
convertible debt or puttable stock in the exercise of their governance or
control rights. This focus may provide a more plausible explanation for the
reservations about upstream conversions. In the absence of legal restric-
tions, puttable common stock and convertible debt can be designed to have
the same structure of financial payoffs. In that case, investors in either
type of security have essentially the same preferences regarding the firm's
investment strategy. At very low firm values, both sets of investors are
likely to end up as debtholders when their respective options expire: the
47. Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy
Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 170 (1989); Allan C. Eberhart & Lemma W.
Senbet, Absolute Priority Rule Violations and Risk Incentives for Financially Distressed Firms, FIN.
MGMfT., Autumn 1993, at 101; Katherine Daigle & Michael T. Maloney, Residual Claims in
Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Explanation, 37 J.L. & ECON. 157, 158 (1994).
48. Adler, supra note 20, at 473-75; Lucian A. Bebehuk, The Effects of Chapter 11 and Debt
Renegotiation on Ex Ante Corporate Decisions, 50 J. FIN. (forthcoming 1995).
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puttable stockholder will convert and the convertible debtholder will not.
Therefore, the investors share the conservative preferences of debtholders.
At very high firm values, they are both more likely to end up as sharehold-
ers and therefore have the risk-taking preferences of equityholders. When
their options (put or call) are at or near the money, however, the holders
of these hybrids are risk-preferring to a degree even greater than
equityholders.
To illustrate these risk preferences, we can compare the perspective of
a puttable stockholder with an option to put each share to the firm for $8
in debt with that of an ordinary common stockholder. Suppose the stock
is currently valued at $9 per share. Both parties enjoy the same gain if the
stock value rises. However, the ordinary shareholder is more vulnerable to
declines in firm value. A risky venture that renders the firm insolvent costs
the ordinary stockholder the entire $9 in value, while, in the absence of
legal restrictions, the puttable stockholder can salvage a debt claim with
face value of $8.
Within corporate governance structures, control rights are perhaps best
thought of as contingent on verifiable indicia.49 At the time debt is
issued, equityholders usually hold decisionmaking authority and delegate
such authority to the firm's management. The decision space is constrained
by terms agreed to in the firm's contracts with its creditors and other
stakeholders (e.g., covenants). Within that space, however, managers are
subject to legal inducements to act as agents of their shareholders. At the
same time, debt contracts provide for the transfer of control from
shareholders to debtholders upon the occurrence of (more or less) verifiable
events of default. The most common is the failure of the firm to meet its
payment obligations to the debtholder. Upon such default, the debtholder
typically has the right to accelerate the maturity of the debt and to enforce
its claim against assets of the firm. If it exercises these rights, the
debtholder can remove assets from the control of the firm's management
and equityholders. If the firm is insolvent, the debtholders may have the
right to take control of the entire firm as a going concern or to petition it
into bankruptcy. Alternatively, the debtholders may choose not to displace
the firm's management, but instead to assume control over the firm's
decisions merely by threatening to exercise default rights.
Economists argue that shareholders have the best decisionmaking
incentives in solvent firms because, as residual claimants, they bear the
49. See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 1; Jaime F. Zender, Optimal Financial Instruments, 46 J.
FiN. 1645 (1991).
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marginal gains and losses from the firm's decisions. The contingent
allocation of control to debtholders in the event of nonpayment is then
justified because nonpayment is a reasonably good indicator that the firm
is insolvent or marginally solvent and, consequently, that equityholders no
longer have the superior decisionmaking incentives. The contingent
allocation of control to debtholders is thus determined by the repayment
obligations that the firm agrees to undertake. Moreover, in many debt
contracts, default is defined more broadly than the failure to make a debt
payment when it is due. It may include, for example, the issuance of
secured debt, the sale of assets, the failure to insure assets, or the failure to
maintain a specified minimum asset to debt ratio. The violation of a
covenant typically constitutes an event of default that transfers control to
the debtholder. Covenants and events of default are contract terms. Thus,
the conditions for transfer of control are negotiated ex ante between the
debtholders and the firm.
Although convertible debtholders and puttable common shareholders
might share the same structure of payoffs and risk preferences, they are
typically assigned different levers over managerial decisions in the
governance structure of the company. Puttable stockholders often enjoy the
control rights of common stockholders: to vote and enforce fiduciary duties.
Debtholders do not vote and are not owed fiduciary obligations, even if
they have rights to convert to common stock." Yet, they have the
contingent control rights described above that are triggered by default terms
negotiated ex ante with the issuer (e.g., a set of covenants, events of
default, and acceleration rights). The packaging of these contingent control
rights and financial claims of hybrid instruments may affect the incentives
of investors in the exercise of their allocated governance levers. In this
regard, we noted above that the holders of hybrid instruments that combine
liquidation priorities and residual claims have a greater preference for risk
than even equityholders when their options are at or near the money.
Voting common stock typically affords control rights across most solvent
states, which include these moments of extreme risk preference. Convert-
ible debtholders, in contrast, are much less likely to have control rights at
such time. Convertible debtholders gain control either when they convert
into common stock or when their enforcement rights are triggered by an
event of default. At the time of issuance, the option of the convertible
debtholder is typically out of the money: the firm's financial condition must
50. For cases holding that no fiduciary duty is owed to convertible debtholders, see Kessler v.
General Cable Corp., 155 Cal. Rptr. 94, 100 (Ct. App. 1979); Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 788-91
(Del. Ch. 1987); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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improve for the option to be at or in the money. It is therefore unlikely
that events of default would be triggered to give the debtholder influence
over firm investment decisions when its option is at or near the money.
Indeed, covenants in convertible debt instruments tend to be much weaker
than those in straight debt.
Convertible debt reduces the tendency of a firm to take excessive risks
because it removes some of the upside risk from voting shareholders and
gives it to nonvoting convertible debtholders. The stockholders have less
of a reason to prefer risk and the convertible debtholders lack the levers
with which to influence firm decisions at the times of their greatest risk
preference. In contrast, the issuance of voting puttable stock divides the
upside between two groups of voting stockholders. The existing stockhold-
ers may have less incentive to take risks but the puttable voting stockhold-
ers may have extreme risk preference when their put is at or near the
money. The net effect on firm risk taking is far more difficult to predict
and is beyond the scope of this paper. The restrictions on the exercise of
a puttable stockholder's put simply divides the payoffs and risks differently
between puttable stockholders and the other equityholders, with the result
being no less equivocal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issuance of convertible debt by public corporations is widespread.
Its motivation may be to signal favorable private information about the
prospects of the firm or to reduce agency costs by mitigating the incentive
of shareholders to increase the risks taken by the firm. Absent legal
restrictions, puttable stock replicates the contingent cash claims that are
produced by convertible debt. The use of puttable stock is subject to
regulation under state corporate statutes. The mildest restriction prevents
the exercise of the put when the firm would be insolvent thereafter. We
show that this restriction impedes the ability of puttable stock issue to
fulfill a signalling role like that of convertible debt. The most significant
difference between convertible debt and puttable stock is the nature of their
control or governance rights, rather than the fact that puttable stock
involves upstream rather than downstream conversion. Convertible
debtholders usually have control rights defined by contractually specified
events of default; puttable stockholders may have voting rights across all
solvent states of the world. We suggest that the issuance of puttable stock
with voting rights cannot mitigate the risk-taking tendency of a leveraged
firm in the way that convertible debt can. A financial claim, such as
convertible debt and puttable stock, that combines participation in residue
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in good times and liquidation priority in bad times is more appropriately
packaged with the contingent control rights traditionally allocated to
debtholders rather than voting rights. This, rather than the direction of
conversion rights, may explain the relative frequency of the use of puttable
stock and convertible debt. Still, mandatory restrictions on puttable stock,
such as those that continue to appear in corporate statutes, remain to be
justified.
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/30
